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This paper aims to construct a model of endogenous technological change, in-
corporating variety and quality innovations. The technological frontier advances
as a result of their interactions. The importance of this exercise lies not only in
richer realism but also that it enlarges the set of possible equilibrium and the policy
implications of the model with homogeneous R&D can be reversed in some cases.
This is because knowledge created in variety and quality R&D di¤er in nature and
the structure of the knowledge stock assumed determines the way its externality
a¤ects productivity of research activities.
JEL Classi…cation: O10, O30, O40.
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The R&D-based growth model places pro…t-seeking research activities at the centre of en-
dogenising technological progress. There are two types of models in this literature. In the
…rst type, technological advance expands variety of products available (see Grossman and
Helpman (1991, Ch.3) Romer (1990)), and the second type focuses on the improvement
of the quality of products. (see Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman
(1991, Ch.4)). These models capture many important aspects of technological progress,
which are characterized by the “horizontal” form of increasing specialization of goods (e.g.
the original invention of computer chips) and the “vertical” form of continual replacement
of old goods with the state-of-the-art products (e.g. the dramatic increase of transistors
contained in a single chip).
However, an important limitation in this literature is that all di¤erent forms of tech-
nological advance that the economy achieves is aggregated in the homogeneous form of
either variety or quality innovations.1Although it is justi…ed as a …rst approximation of
a complicated process of technical change, it misses one of its essential aspects, i.e. the
technological frontier advances as a result of interactions between heterogeneous research
activities.
The literature on technical progress stresses that di¤erent types of innovation play a
qualitatively di¤erent role in driving the technological frontier. For example, Dosi (1982)
distinguishes between technological paradigms and technological trajectories. The former
determines the broad directions of technical progress and the latter drive technological
progress within a paradigm. The discovery of semiconductors and subsequent innovation
1See Jones (1995) for other limitations on empirical grounds..
1in computer chips, etc. can be interpreted as technological paradigm and trajectory re-
spectively. Similar concepts of technological paradigms are found in Freeman and Perez’s
(1986) “techno-economic paradigm”, Rosenberg’s (1976, Ch.6) “focusing devices” and Sa-
hal’s (1985) “technological guide-posts”. Furthermore, from the standpoint of economic
history, Mokyr (1993) distinguishes macro- and micro-inventions in explaining the In-
dustrial Revolution. For example, the invention of the steam engine (macro-invention)
generated a discontinuous leap in the technological frontier, and its subsequent improve-
ment in designs (micro-invention) resulted in signi…cant productivity gains.
A contribution of the present paper is to construct a more general model of endoge-
nous technological change to capture the heterogenous nature of technological progress,
which was described above. It gives a disaggregative view of how the technological frontier
advances on the basis of interactions of di¤erent research activities. In our model, variety
R&D increases the range of goods and creates the possibility of quality R&D. In return,
quality R&D a¤ects pro…ts and productivity of variety R&D, and the latter also in‡u-
ence those of quality R&D. The resulting relative research productivity and pro…tability
determines the allocation of resources, which in turn decides the course of technological
progress. Thus, the present paper also makes a methodological contribution to integrating
the two types of R&D-based growth model based on quality and variety innovations.
The importance of integrating variety and quality innovations lies not only in richer
realism but also in that (i) policy implications of the benchmark model can be reversed in
some cases and (ii) multiple steady states arise and transitional dynamics are characterised
by histeresis, despite the fact that R&D – the engine of growth in this model – is a forward-
looking activity. This arises due to the fact that knowledge created in variety R&D and
2knowledge generated in quality R&D di¤er in nature, and hence the structure of the
knowledge stock accumulated in the past determines the way its externality a¤ects the
productivity of research activities.
We examine two di¤erent structures of knowledge stock which are consistent with con-
stant long-run growth. The case of a unique steady-state in the present model is compa-
rable with the benchmark homogeneous R&D model. The latter predicts that subsidizing
(taxing) R&D unambiguously improves (worsens) the growth prospect. This straightfor-
ward implication does not hold in our quality-variety framework, because encouraging
one type of R&D makes the other relatively less attractive. It will be demonstrated that
whether a subsidy to R&D improves growth and welfare depends upon the knowledge
structure, the strength of externality and which R&D is subsidized. This result indicates
that the e¤ect of industrial policy is not as predictable as the benchmark model suggests.
Furthermore, when two steady states exist, a low growth equilibrium is Pareto-inferior.
There can also be a no-growth equilibrium. These equilibria are interpreted as the “un-
derdevelopment” trap. It turns out that a subsidy to variety R&D is conducive to “in-
dustrialization”, but the situation gets worse if quality R&D is subsidized. Some recent
studies (e.g. Bland and Francois (1996)) suggest that a research subsidy is a powerful
instrument in bringing about “take-o¤”. Our result casts doubt on this straightforward
implication.
When there exist multiple steady states, the selection of an equilibrium path arises
as an important issue. It is typically determined by expectations in the homogeneous
R&D-based growth models (e.g. Young (1993a)), since expectations are an essential ele-
ment of forward-looking research activities. In our model, despite the fact that it shares
3the same feature, history (the initial condition) determines a unique equilibrium trajec-
tory. Intuitively, the knowledge stock is the accumulation of innovations in the past, and
heterogeneity in knowledge makes this aspect more prominent in the determination of
an equilibrium. This result is notable, since the history versus expectation distinction is
important in the context of policy implications. If expectations determine an equilibrium,
the role of a government should be limited to encouraging entrepreneurial spirits to pro-
mote growth. If hysteresis arises, on the other hand, merely promoting optimism is not
su¢cient and a more active public intervention may be called for.
There were earlier attempts to combine the two strands of R&D-based models in some-
what di¤erent ways. In Young’s (1995) discrete-time period model, quality innovations
occur every period, and the number of varieties is determined in each period by equating
one period pro…ts to a …xed cost. Thus, variety R&D technology is not explicitly speci-
…ed. In Helpman and Trajtenberg (1994,1996), variety R&D creates inputs “compatible”
with a particular level of quality. That is, the roles of quality and variety innovations
in our model are reversed in their studies. However, quality innovations are assumed to
arrive exogenously. A similar model was developed by Amable (1995), in which both
types of R&D are endogenized. But in this model knowledge is created only by quality
innovations, i.e. knowledge is homogeneous despite the fact that research activities are
heterogeneous.
Much closer to our study is Aghion and Howitt (1996), who distinguish between funda-
mental and secondary R&D. However, their model is of a variety-variety type. As a result,
there is no complete obsolescence of goods. More importantly, Aghion and Howitt (1996)
consider a unique steady state only, whereas we will pay close attention to transitional
4dynamics and the possibility of multiple steady states.
There are several other important contributions in the area where two endogenous ac-
tivities drive long-run growth. Citing some representative studies, learning by doing and
product innovation are modelled in Stokey (1988) and Young (1993b). Stokey (1991) com-
bines human capital accumulation and quality innovation. Segerstrom (1991), Grossman
and Helpman (1991, Chs.11,12) and Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) analyze the interac-
tions of innovative and imitative research. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1992) explore the
implications of distinguishing between innovations and “General Purpose Technologies”.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The model is developed in Section 2, and Section
3 derives equilibrium conditions. This is followed by the analysis of equilibrium dynamics
and steady state under di¤erent assumptions regarding the knowledge structure in Section
4. In addition, we examine comparative statics and explore their implications there.
Section 5 conducts welfare analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The present model is based on Grossman and Helpman (1991). Hence, we highlight only
distinctive features of the model in what follows.
2.1 Consumers and Final Output Producers
The intertemporal utility function of consumers is time-separable, and their common
instantaneous utility function is logarithmic in the …nal output, which is denoted by
y(t): They di¤er as suppliers of labor service: (i) L unskilled workers are employed to
manufacture intermediate products, and (ii) H skilled workers are exclusively used for
5research purposes.2L and H are constant. Since the aggregate expenditure is normalized,
the interest rate equals consumers’ rate of time preference ½.













where 0 < ® < 1, xni(t) denotes the quantity of inputs, qni(t) is their quality levels, and
N(t) is the number of varieties of intermediate goods.3
In the benchmark models, the initial quality of products is given. However, it is more
realistic to assume that it is endogenously determined.4To capture this, we de…ne the
quality index as
qni (t) = °
ni(t)z (¿)
" ; ° > 1; 1 > " ¸ 0; ni (t) = 0;1;2;::: (2)
where ¿ is the time when the ith variety was invented and z(¿) denotes the economy-
wide average quality at ¿:5A parameter " represents the strength of externality of the
past innovations on the initial quality of the newest variety. We will de…ne z(¿) more
speci…cally later.
2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
Distinct quality products are perfect substitutes in the ith variety in the production
function (1). Hence only the state-of-the-art intermediate good is used, and its demand
2We could assume homogenous labour force, following the literature. But it just complicates the
presentation without a¤ecting the results to be derived below except for welfare analysis.
3The exponent of qni(t) in (1), i.e. (1¡®)=®; is intended to facilitate the presentation without a¤ecting
the results.
4For example, the invention of transistors required a high standard of purity of semiconductors. The
purity level was constrained by the then technology. If technological and scienti…c knowledge at that time
were higher, the purity standard would be higher and the initial quality of transistors may be higher as
well. (Rosenberg, 1982, p.151).






0 qni0 (t)pni0 (t)
¡1=(1¡®)di0: (3)
Since we assume that one unskilled worker is required to produce one unit of xni(t)
and (3) has the constant price elasticity of ¡1=(1 ¡ ®), the pro…t maximizing price is
pni(t) = wL (t)=® for ° ¸ ®
¡ ®
1¡® where wL(t) is wages of unskilled workers.6Thus the
total pro…ts arising from selling the ith input is





A variety innovator earns pro…ts equivalent to (4) with qni(t) = z (¿)
" ; t ¸ ¿: But
his product becomes obsolete once it is improved upon by a quality innovator. However,
it is assumed that the original variety technology is essential to the production of that
variety irrespective of its quality levels. Thus, the quality innovator producing the state-
of-the-art good pay a fraction 0 < · < 1 of pro…ts as royalty to the original variety
inventor. There are two possible interpretations of ·: It may be viewed as the breadth of
patents. Alternatively, it may represent a relative bargaining power measure, such as legal
enforcement of patent protection that in‡uences the magnitude of the royalty payment.







¼ni (t) for ni = 0;







0 for ni = 0;
(1 ¡ ·)¼ni(t) for ni ¸ 1;
(5)
where the superscripts v and q are for variety and quality.
Observe that (5) captures various types of the business-stealing e¤ect. First, pro…ts of
a variety innovator are reduced by 1¡· when the …rst quality innovation occurs. Second,
6This pricing rule arises due to “drastic innovation”. If the innovation is not drastic, pni(t) = °wL(t):
We concentrate on the case of drastic innovation, since the main results do not hinge on this.
7We could assume ¼v
ni = 0 for ni = 0; in which case a variety innovation does not directly lead to a
blueprint of a commercial product and generates pro…ts only after the …rst quality innovation. But it
does not make substantial di¤erences in the following analysis.
7pro…ts of quality innovators are lost whenever quality improvement occurs in the same
variety. Third, as the new variety is introduced, …nal goods producers spread their costs
over wider range of goods, reducing pro…ts of existing inputs. This is captured by an
increase in N(t) in (4). Fourth, as quality improvement occurs in the ith variety, …nal
goods producers increase their demand for it at the expense of the other products, reducing
their pro…ts. This is represented by an increase in qni0(t); i0 6= i; in the denominator of
(4).
2.3 Quality and Variety R&D
Next we describe R&D technologies:8
_ N (t) =
Hv (t)Kv (t)
avZ (t)









; ni = 1;2;::: (7)
where _ N(t) is an incremental increase in variety; »
q
ni(t) is the Poisson arrival rate of the
nth quality innovation;9Hv(t) and H
q
i (t) are the number of skilled workers used in variety
and quality R&D; ak, k = v;q; are positive constants; and Kv(t) and Kq(t) are knowledge
conducive to each type of R&D. The presence of Z(t) and qni(t) in the denominators in
(6) and (7) implies that both inventions become increasingly di¢cult as the technological
frontier advances.
For simplicity, incumbent …rms are assumed not to conduct research due to the so-
8A “dot” means a time derivative.
9At …rst look, variety R&D seems to involve no uncertainty, whereas quality R&D is stochastic. But






instead of the …rst equation of (1) and that N takes integers and rises with a
Poisson arrival rate of HvKv




avZ ds; so that the expected
change of N is equivalent to HvKv
avZ : Thus, the …rst equation of (6) should be viewed as a reduced form of
a stochastic process.
8called replacement e¤ect. Successful entrepreneurs with new innovative inputs attain the
stock market value V
q
ni(t) or V v(t): In the frictionless stock market, V
q
ni(t) and V v(t) must































The left-hand sides are the rate of return to safe bonds, and the right-hand sides are the
rate of return to an equity of innovative …rms (consist of the capital gain, the earning-
price ratio and the risk of losing pro…ts in future). In (9), vv(t) is the present value of
the ‡ow of pro…ts which accrue to the variety innovator after the …rst quality innovation.
The presence of 1 > [V v(t) ¡ vv(t)]=V v(t) > 0 re‡ects the fact that the variety innovator
loses only a part of his pro…ts following the …rst quality innovation:10











for Hv(t) > 0 and H
q
i (t) > 0 where wH(t) is wages of skilled workers.
10The derivation of (9) goes as follows. The value function V v(t) must satisfy the following recursive
equation:
V v (t) = ¼v
0N (t)dt + (1 ¡ ½dt)fV v (t + dt)[1 ¡ »
q
1N (t)dt] + vv (t + dt)»
q
1N (t)dtg
which says that the variety innovator earns ¼v
0N(t) during the time interval dt and, at the end of this
interval, attains V v(t+dt) if quality innovation does not occur and vv(t+dt) if it does. Rearranging this
equation and letting dt ! 0 gives rise to (9).
93 Equilibrium Conditions
3.1 Research Arbitrage
The …rst equilibrium condition concerns the choice of R&D by entrepreneurs. First we
consider the choice among di¤erent quality R&D projects.
Lemma 1 For H
q




q (t) for all i; n: (11)
Proof. In order for quality R&D to be active in all existing varieties, entrepreneurs must
be indi¤erent to any quality R&D projects. Then the second condition of (10) implies
that V
q
ni(t)Kq(t)=aqqni(t) = wH(t) must hold for any i and n. Equating this for any i and
n and using (8) gives (11).
Given this lemma, one can verify that11


















qni(t)di; for ni (t) = 0;1;2::: (13)
where A(t) is the level of technology that the economy has achieved at t: Rearranging the






It implies that the Poisson arrival rate is a¤ected not only by the number of researchers
at t but also by the knowledge stock.









q (s)ds)n=n! = e(°¡1)
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0 »q(s)ds:









from (6). Observe that the values of »
q and »
v crucially depend on how the knowledge
structure, i,e. Kq and Kv, is speci…ed.
Next we turn to entrepreneurs’ choice between variety and quality R&D. Since they









where a = aq=av and K = Kv=Kq: For those engaging in variety R&D, their opportunity
costs re‡ect the foregone value of quality innovation. Hence the right-hand side of (16)
can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of variety R&D, which is equated to the value
of variety innovation.
Lemma 2 Research arbitrage between quality and variety R&D (16) can be rewritten as
½ =
(1 ¡ ·) _ V v (t)=V v (t) ¡ aK (t) _ V q (t)=V q (t) + ·aK (t)»
q (t)
1 ¡ · ¡ aK (t)
(R)
for »
v(t) > 0, »
q(t) > 0 and 1 ¡ · ¡ aK(t) > 0:
Proof. See Appendix 6.
Equation (R) re-expresses (16) in terms of the two no-arbitrage conditions (8) and
(9). The parameter restriction 1¡·¡aK(t) > 0 holds if quality research productivity is
relatively more e¢cient and the pro…t share of quality innovators is relatively large. This
re‡ects the fact that the risk of losing pro…ts is greater for quality innovators than variety
innovators.12
12If this restriction does not hold, all entrepreneurs opt for variety R&D. As we noted earlier, the
present model can be easily modi…ed such workers are homogenous. Then if 1¡· ¡aK · 0; the variety
model of Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.3) emerges as a special case of the present model.
113.2 Financial Arbitrage
Consumers save in bonds or/and equities of research …rms. For consumers to be indi¤erent
between investing in any variety and quality research …rms, the no-arbitrage conditions
in (8) and (9) should be equalized in ½, as their right hand sides give the returns from




_ V v (t)=V v (t) ¡ _ V q (t)=V q (t) + [1 ¡ aK (t)]»
q (t)






v > 0 and »
q > 0.
3.3 Factor Markets





using (3). Skilled workers are used only for research:
H
v (t) + H
q (t) = H: (S)
3.4 Growth Rate
The aggregate production function (1) can be reduced to y(t) = LA(t)
1¡®
® . Appendix 6















In (17), Q(t) is interpreted as the average quality level achieved across intermediate goods
industries through quality R&D. This interpretation may become clearer if one considers
12the case of " = 0; i.e. Z(t) = 1: Appendix 6 also shows that Q(t) changes o¤ steady state
according to
_ Q(t) = (1 ¡ ")(° ¡ 1)»
q (t)Q(t) ¡ [Q(t) ¡ 1]»
v (t): (18)










v ¡ (1 ¡ ")(° ¡ 1)»
q (19)
where »
v > (1 ¡ ")(° ¡ 1)»
q is required for a positive …nite output. The intuition for (18)
and the second equation of (19) is straightforward. First suppose " = 0: The level of Q
and its rate of change is positively a¤ected by »
q; since a higher »
q means more frequent
quality innovations. But a higher »
v increases the speed of introducing new varieties with
the lowest quality level among existing goods (i.e. Z (t) = 1): This tends to reduce Q
and _ Q. This intuition also holds for " > 0: Turning to the …rst equation of (19), recall
that »
v (t) and »
q (t) are a¤ected by how knowledge Kv (t) and Kq (t) are speci…ed (see
equations (14) and (15)). It follows that the growth rate crucially depends upon the
structure of knowledge.
4 Knowledge Structure
There are four types of knowledge structure which are consistent with constant long-run
growth: (i) Kv = Kq = A; (ii)Kv = Kq = NZ, (iii) Kv = A and Kq = NZ; and (iv)
Kv = NZ and Kq = A: Due to limits of the space, we consider only the symmetric
cases of (i) and (ii) in detail, as other asymmetric cases generate similar results.13Case (i)
implies that the past variety and quality innovations are both bene…cial to research. In
contrast, case (ii) postulates that only past variety innovations make explicit contributions
13See Li (1997) for cases (iii) and (iv).
13to R&D,14although quality innovations make variety-speci…c knowledge spillovers which
are implicit in the quality index.
4.1 Case I: Kv = Kq = A
4.1.1 Equilibrium
Equation (15) and the second equation of (19) imply Hv = av»
v ¡ av(1 ¡ ")(° ¡ 1)»
v in
steady state where the second term represents the positive e¤ect of Kv:15Equation (14)
also implies Hq = °aq»
q; so that the skilled labor market condition (S) can be written as
H = av»
v + [1 ¡ (1 ¡ ")(1 ¡ 1=°)=a]°aq»







is required if we rule out the case where the positive externality of knowledge on vari-
ety research more than o¤sets the factor demand of quality R&D. This assumption is
maintained in this subsection.
Proposition 1 For Kv = Kq = A;























where ¢ = a["(° ¡ 1) + ·]=[(1 ¡ · ¡ a)°] + a ¡ (1 ¡ ")(1 ¡ 1=°) > 0;
2. a unique saddle-path stable equilibrium with Hv > 0 and Hq > 0 exists if aq½ <
(1 ¡ a=¢)H;
14Note that the latest variety innovation generates intermediate goods with quality level of Z.
15In what follows, the time argument is dropped where it is obvious.
14Figure 1: Equilibrium dynamics for Kv = Kq = A:
3. perfect foresight is contradicted in any other trajectories diverging from the equilib-
rium.
Proof. see Appendix 6.
Equations (R1) and (S1) are interpreted as the research arbitrage and skilled-labor full-
employment conditions respectively in (Hq;Q) space.16Figure 1 depicts the two schedules.
It demonstrates that a unique equilibrium labelled E is saddle-path stable and that Hq and
Hv are constant even in transition. What is changing along the convergent path is Q. In
(17), Q is a function of A; N and Z; all of which depends upon the cumulation of the past
innovations. Hence the economy does not immediately jump to the equilibrium, unlike
in Grossman and Helpman (1991). Equation (15) can be rewritten as »
v = HvQ(t)=av,
implying that _ »
v
> 0 to the left of E; and _ »
v
< 0 to the right of E: But »
q is constant, as
(14) gives »
q = Hq=°aq.
16To analyze the market allocation of skilled workers, we can ignore equation (U), since it just deter-
mines wL.
















Note that it is independent of Q; so that an iso-growth contour is a horizontal line in
Figure 1. If (1¡1=°)=a > 1; the growth rate is increasing northward, but it is decreasing
if the inequality is reversed.
4.1.2 Comparative Statics
First, we establish the following proposition.















in steady state, which is strictly increasing in the growth rate.
Proof. Denote ³ = _ A=A, so that the reduced form of the production function (1)
becomes y(t) = Le
1¡®
® ³t where A0 = 1 without loss of generality and g = 1¡®
® ³. Using
these equations, a consumer’s intertemporal utility function can be rewritten as (22).
Note that due to Proposition 2, the comparative statics of g is equivalent to U apart
from ½ and L: Results are summarized in Table 1 where Ã
k; k = v;q; denotes the pro-
portion of R&D costs subsidized by a lump-sum transfer. Rows (i) and (ii) show that
as ½ rises, the number of skilled workers used in variety R&D falls whereas quality R&D
increases its employment. Using the intuition o¤ered by Aghion and Howitt (1996), this
is due to a more forward-looking nature of variety R&D than quality R&D, as the oppor-
tunity for the latter is opened up by the former.
17This is derived from equations (14), (15) and (19).
16Table 1: Comparative Statics
H L ® ½ · " ° av aq Ã
v Ã
q
(i) Hv + 0 0 ¡ + + §¤ ¡ + + ¡
(ii) Hq + 0 0 + ¡ ¡ §¤¤ + ¡ ¡ +
(iii) g for
1¡1=°
a < 1 + 0 ¡ ¡ + + §¤ ¡ + + ¡
(iv) g for 1
1¡" >
1¡1=°
a > 1 + 0 ¡ + ¡ ¡ §¤¤ + ¡ ¡ +
¤ ¡ if 1 ¡ a > " and + if 1 ¡ a < ":
¤¤ + if 1 ¡a > " and ¡ if 1 ¡ a < ":
If " = 0; we must have
1¡1=°
a < 1 from (20). In this case, g is an increasing function of
Hv (see (21)). Thus, the intuition behind the results of row (iii) that g is higher as · and
aq increase and ° and av decrease should be clear: they make variety R&D relatively more
attractive to entrepreneurs. A higher · raises the pro…t share of variety innovators; a high
aq makes quality R&D less productive; a lower av increases variety research productivity;
a smaller ° means that quality R&D productivity improves (see (7)), and this e¤ect is
only partially o¤set by a lower pro…t (see (4)), tending to increase Hq. Given these results,
it is clear that for " = 0, subsidizing variety R&D and taxing quality R&D raises g.
However, some of the results concerning g can be reversed if the strength of the
externality on the initial quality " is su¢ciently strong, as row (iv) shows. This case can
be interpreted as the “over-accumulation” of knowledge, as A is an increasing function of ":
In this case, the government should subsidize quality R&D or tax variety R&D to raise the
growth rate and welfare. Thus the e¤ect of the industrial policy crucially depends on the
parameter "; indicating the di¢culties facing governments. Such di¢culties may be even
greater, as it is often hard to distinguish between variety and quality innovations before
and even after innovations are actually made. Thus, amore realistic case is the untargetted
subsidy, i.e. both types of R&D are subsidised at the same rate. In thise case, nothing
will change since both research activities become equally attractive to entrepreneurs.
17Finally, we brie‡y touch upon a parameter ·: If it is interpreted as the breadth of
patent, the government can maximize welfare by setting · su¢ciently high to the extent
that Hv = H or su¢ciently low so that Hq = H, depending on the value of ":18As
we shall see, this second best outcome coincides with the …rst best. However, this kind
of intervention may not be as straightforward as it seems, because of the di¢culty in
distinguishing between variety and quality R&D, as mentioned above.
4.2 Case II: Kv = Kq = NZ
4.2.1 Equilibrium
Under this knowledge structure, it is convenient to illustrate the prominent dynamic
feature by specifying the system in terms of »
q and Q rather than Hq and Q.
Proposition 3 For Kv = Kq = NZ;













_ Q = [(1 ¡ ")(° ¡ 1) + °a(Q ¡ 1)]»
qQ ¡
H
av (Q ¡ 1); (S2)
where Á = a["(° ¡ 1) + ·]=(1 ¡ a ¡ ·) + °a ¡ (1 ¡ ")(° ¡ 1) > 0; as non-trivial
equilibrium requires °a > (1 ¡ ")(° ¡ 1);
2. there are two steady states: (i) the high-growth steady state is saddle-path stable,
and (ii) the low-growth equilibrium is unstable;
3. the high-growth steady state is Pareto-superior to the low growth one;
18If R&D technologies exhibit diminishing returns in research workers, the social optimum involves
Hv > 0 and Hq > 0:
18Figure 2: Equilibrium dynamics for Kv = Kq = NZ:
4. perfect foresight is contradicted in any other trajectories diverging from these steady
states.
Proof. see Appendix 6.
Equations (R2) and (S2) are the research arbitrage and skilled labor market conditions
in (»
q;Q) space. They are depicted in Figure 2. There are three possibilities: (i) the two
curves intersect at two steady states; (ii) they are tangential with a unique steady state;
and (iii) no intersection exists. Implications of (ii) and (iii) will be explored later on, and







¢ (° ¡ 1)»
q; (23)
which gives a set of iso-growth contours in Figure 2. Since they are upward-sloping and
g becomes higher as the economy moves leftward, the growth rate is higher at EH than
EL. A salient feature of dynamics is that a saddle path is emanating directly from the
low growth steady state to the high growth one.19Result (3) of Proposition 3 is obvious
19To show this, consider other trajectories starting from the _ »
q
= 0 and _ Q = 0 curves between EH and
EL. The economy must move leftward horizontally if it is on the curve _ »
q
= 0 and vertically upward if
19from Proposition 2.
An intuition behind multiplicity of steady states is best provided by examining the
rate of return to quality R&D in the ith variety, which is the right-hand side of (8). It
is denoted by rq.20Using (14) and (15) and the second equations of (10) and (19), steady
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(1 ¡ ")(° ¡ 1)
a°
Hq
Hv + 1 (26)
The …rst two terms on the right-hand side of (24) represents the rate of depreciation of the
value of quality innovation as time elapses by dt. As newer varieties are introduced at t+dt,
…nal goods producers dissipate their expenditure, reducing their demand for individual
inputs. This is captured by the …rst term ¡Hv=aq: Moreover, the newer varieties have
the initial quality Z (t + dt): This tends to make …nal goods producers reduce demand for
other existing intermediate goods. The second term ¡"(° ¡ 1)Hq=°aqQ represents this
e¤ect. The third term is the earnings-price ratio (¼ni=V
q
ni); and the fourth term is the risk
of losing pro…ts due to future quality innovation in the same variety.
The second line (25) is obtained by using the …nancial arbitrage condition (F) which
relates wH to Hq:21Note that Hv and Hq in (25) are the current number of skilled workers
in respective R&D, whereas those in (26) represent employment in the research sector
it is on the curve _ Q = 0. It follows that those paths cannot be the saddle path reaching EH, and the
remaining possibility is only the orbit starting from EL.
20We can equally examine the rate of return to variety R&D for this purpose. But the intuition we
obtain is the same, since the rates of the return to quality and variety R&D are identical due to the
…nancial arbitrage condition (F).




"(° ¡ 1) + 1 ¡ a




20in the past, since Q re‡ects the external e¤ects of the past innovations. Bearing these
in mind, it is clear in (25) that holding Q constant, rq is strictly decreasing in Hv and
increasing in Hq; i.e. there is a one-to-one relationship between the current Hv and Hq
for a given Q: On the other hand, if we take Q (i.e. the past innovations) into account,
rq is still monotonically increasing in Hq, whereas it has a
T
-shaped relation with Hv: In
other words, two di¤erent values of Hv are consistent with a given Hq: As (26) shows, if
the past Hv has been high, Q is low, which in turn implies rq > ½ for a given Hq in (25).
To restore rq = ½; the current Hv must be higher. Similarly if the past Hv has been low,
Q is high and the current Hv must be su¢ciently low for rq = ½: Thus, the current Hv
crucially depends on the past Hv. Compared with the previous case, this case highlights
the essential role of the structure of knowledge in generating multiple steady states.
This history-dependent explanation of multiple steady states contrasts with expec-
tational multiple equilibria in Young (1993a) in which the current research intensity is
high or low, since it is expected to be so in future. In his model, there are “overlaps” of
two stable arms converging to di¤erent steady states, and the economy can be on either
trajectory, depending upon agents’ expectations. In this sense, there are multiple equi-
libria and an equilibrium is indeterminate. In contrast, our model exhibits only a single
trajectory converging to the high growth steady state, and the economy must always be
on it in transition. In this sense, there exists a unique equilibrium at each moment of time
and equilibrium is determinate in the presence of multiple steady states. This is because
the accumulation of the past innovations exerts a dominant force in the selection of an
equilibrium, i.e. hysteresis.
214.2.2 Low-Growth Equilibrium and Underdevelopment
Since history plays a dominant role, the economy is “trapped” in the low growth steady
state if it starts from there. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 2, there exists a stable
trajectory starting from the low growth steady state to the high growth one. This suggests
that a small disturbance to the system such as an R&D subsidy helps the economy to
escape from the trap.
We …rst consider the case of targetted R&D subsidies. Suppose that the economy is
initially located at EL in Figure 3. Since a variety R&D subsidy makes quality R&D
relatively less attractive to entrepreneurs, »
q falls for a given Q: As a result, the _ »
q
= 0
schedule shifts downward, moving steady states to Ev
H and Ev
L: On the other hand, a
subsidy to quality R&D shifts the _ »
q





L: New stable paths run from Ek
L to Ek
H; k = v;q: Following an industrial
policy, the economy must be on a new saddle path at Q. It should be clear from the …gure
that the economy can …nd itself on a path leading to a high growth steady state if and
only if the _ »
q
= 0 curve moves downward, i.e. variety R&D is subsidized or quality R&D
is taxed. Note that this result is valid even if a policy shift is temporary.
Another comparative dynamic exercise is to start from the situation where the two
schedules do not intersect like a dotted _ »
q
= 0 curve in Figure 3. This arises if variety re-
search technology is relatively ine¢cient. Although quality innovation occurs, the growth
rate asymptotically approaches zero in the absence of the positive externality of variety
innovation.22To revitalize economic growth, the government should move the _ »
q
= 0 curve
downward to make it tangential to or intersect with the _ Q = 0 curve. This task is ac-
22Since variety R&D is not conducted, Hq = H and N = N0 for all t: Hence (14) implies H =
°aq»
q R N0
0 qnidi=N0: Since qni rises, »
q must converge to zero for this equality to hold, i.e. long-run
growth is not sustained.
22Figure 3: The underdevelopment trap.
complished by a subsidy to variety R&D or a tax on quality R&D. On the other hand, if
quality R&D is subsidized or variety R&D is taxed, the _ »
v
= 0 curve shifts upwards with
the result that resources are wasted and the situation gets worse.
However, a caveat is in order. If R&D subsidies are untargetted (both R&D are
subsidised), the _ »
q
= 0 curve does not move, i.e. industrialisation does not occur. For
a successful “take-o¤”, subsidies must be targetted. However, a di¢culty facing the
government is again that it is hard to distinguish between variety and quality R&D. The
more di¢cult this problem, the less unlikely that R&D subsidy is instrumental in bringing
about industrialisation. This result stands in contrast with some studies that emphasise
R&D subsidy as an important policy (e.g. .Bland and Francois (1996)).
It should be mentioned that an increase in · induces exactly the same result as a
variety R&D subsidy (and tax on quality R&D), since both policies raise an incentive for
variety R&D. Thus, the model predicts that how rents are distributed among di¤erent
innovators is one of crucial determinants of industrialisation of developing economies
where rent-seeking activities often pose serious problems.
23Noteworthy is also that the revival of growth momentum in the present model is
di¤erent from the “Big Push” theory of economic development formalized by Murphy,
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) among others. In their model expectations of …rms play a
decisive role in “locking” an economy in underdevelopment due to demand externalities,
whereas in our model ine¢cient research technology makes the economy stagnate and
there is no role played by expectations.
5 Welfare Analysis
This section examines the e¢ciency of the market economy by comparing the laissez-faire
outcome with the social optimum. The social planner maximizes the intertemporal utility
function of a representative consumer. Since »
v and »
q di¤er depending on the knowledge
structure in the market economy, their socially optimal values also di¤ers. However, we
can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The market economy cannot grow excessively, and in general, the market
growth rate is lower than the social optimum, irrespective of the knowledge structure.
Without solving the social planner’s problems, this proposition should be clear from
Proposition 2 which implies that the growth rate is always maximized in the social opti-
mum. This result is despite the fact that the present model captures several types of the
business-stealing e¤ects, which tends to make the laissez-faire economy grow excessively
in the homogenous R&D model. This is due to the assumption of heterogeneous workers.
The optimal allocation of skilled workers is independent of what is going on in the product
market where the business-stealing e¤ect is realised.
24Another type of a market failure which does not exist is the monopoly distortion e¤ect
due to the CES production function (1).23A distortion that gives rise to Proposition 4 is
the intertemporal spillover e¤ect. As (14) and (15) indicate, the current research successes
will raise the future research productivity. Since remunerations for these contributions do
not accrue to the original innovators in the market economy, they constitute a positive
externality.
An important question, given Proposition 4, is that of which research activity should
be subsidized or taxed to achieve the social optimum. Generally the answer depends upon
parameter values. We will demonstrate this by considering the case of Kv = Kq = A as





















v = H; H
q = 0 for a > 1 ¡ 1=°, (28)
H
v = 0; H
q = H for a < 1 ¡ 1=°, (29)
H > H
v; H
v > 0 for a = 1 ¡ 1=°. (30)
This con…rms that the social optimum and the market outcome di¤er in general, except
for the “edge-knife” case in (30), in which the growth rate is independent of the allocation
of skilled workers.24Cases of (28) and (29) suggest that the market economy with Hv > 0
and Hq > 0 can improve welfare by subsidizing variety R&D or taxing quality R&D if
a > 1 ¡ 1=° or by subsidizing quality R&D or taxing variety R&D for a < 1 ¡ 1=°: The
23See Grossman and Helpman (1991, p.70).
24A similar “knife-edge” result would be obtained even if R&D technology exhibits decreasing returns
to skilled labour.
25intuition is straightforward. If a > 1 ¡ 1=°; variety R&D is relatively more productive.
It follows that the growth rate and welfare can be increased by shifting skilled workers to
variety R&D. The reverse is true for a < 1 ¡ 1=°:
6 Conclusion
Given the successes of the R&D-based growth literature in capturing and revealing many
important aspects of modern economic growth, a logical extension is to integrate the two
types of the models based on quality and variety innovations. It sheds light on how the
technological frontier advances as a result of interactions between di¤erent innovations.
We paid close attention to the structure of the knowledge stock, since di¤erent types of
research activities create di¤erent knowledge. It was demonstrated that our synthesized
model could exhibit either multiple steady states or a unique steady state, depending upon
the knowledge structure. Besides, the knowledge structure a¤ects transitional dynamics,
growth rates and comparative statics. The growth process of the economy is crucially
in‡uenced not only by the source of knowledge but also by the composition of the general
knowledge.
We examined the e¤ects of industrial policy. The basic message is that such policy
may not be as reliable as the literature suggests. Strength of externality, the structure of
knowledge and the type of R&D to be subsidised (or taxed) a¤ects the outcome of policy
change. The di¢culty to predict the policy e¤ect is reinforced by the fact that it is not
easy to distinguish between variety and quality innovations ex ante.
A notable feature of our model is that even in the presence of multiple steady states,
the equilibrium is unique for a given initial condition. Young (1993a, p.805) notes that
26“if models of endogenous growth are to be built around external e¤ects, it [the section of
an equilibrium path out of multiple equilibria] is an issue that they must surely, sooner or
later, confront.” Our model o¤ers an answer by focusing on the structure of knowledge.
The future is important, since R&D decisions are based upon the expectation of future
pro…ts and the risk of product obsolescence, but the past is also important, since the
externality of knowledge – a driving force of the endogenous growth model – depends
upon the past innovations.
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 2
Due to the de…nitions of V v(t) and vv(t),
V

















ni (t)Z (t)=qni(t) (32)
where (32) uses (1 ¡ ·)¼0N(T) = (1 ¡ ·)(1 ¡ ®)Z(t)=A(T) = ¼
q
ni(T)Z(t)=qni(t): Making
use of (8), (9) and (32), equation (16) can be re-expressed as (R).
Appendix B: Growth Rate
This appendix derives equations (17), (18) and (19). First we normalize the initial
measure of varieties N0 to 1, so that A(t) =
R 1
0 qni (t)di +
R N(t)
1 qni(t)di: Since there
are a continuum of intermediate goods industries, this allows us to invoke the Law of






0 »q(s)ds where the initial quality of the initial variety is assumed to be 1. Besides,
we have i = e
R ¿
0 »v(s)ds; ¿ · t; where ¿ is the time when the ith variety is …rst introduced.















27Di¤erentiating this gives _ A(t)=A(t) = (° ¡ 1)»
q (t) + »
v (t)=Q(t); which, together with
y(t) = LA(t)(1¡®)=®; leads to (17). This equation and the second equation of (17) give
rise to (18). Since _ Q(t) = 0 in steady states, (18) leads to the second equation of (19),
and substituting this into the …rst equation of (17) leads to that of (19).
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 1
Result (1): For (R1), we …rst derive ¡ _ wH=wH = _ Hq=Hq from (14) and (F). Using
this, (14), (15) and (S), we rewrite (R) to obtain (R1). The di¤erential equation (S1) is
derived from (14), (15), (18) and (S).
Result (2): In steady state, equations (R1) and (S1) collapse to
_ H




; _ Q = 0 ) H
q =
aH (Q ¡ 1)
(1 ¡ ")(1 ¡ 1=°) + a(Q ¡ 1)
(34)
which are depicted in Figure 1. Uniqueness of an equilibrium is evident from the two
equations as long as aq½ < (1 ¡ a=¢)H: Linearization of the system around the steady













avaq < 0: (36)
Hence the equilibrium is a saddle point.
Result (3): First consider paths leading to the horizontal axis where Hq = H¡Hv = 0
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(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ · ¡ a)°
¢ H
q; (37)
28which implies that wH ! 1; as Hq ! 0: Along these paths, we must have V v(t)N(t)Q(t)=av =






¡½(¿¡t)(1 ¡ ®)Z (t)
A(¿)
d¿ <
(1 ¡ ®)Z (t)
½A(t)
< 1 (38)
where A(¿) is rising after t: Clearly perfect foresight is contradicted. Next consider
trajectories leading to the horizontal line at Hq = H: After this line is reached, the





av < wH (T); T < t (39)
where T denotes the time when the Hq = H line is reached. N(T) remains constant after
T; and so does wH(T) due to (37). For (39) to hold, V v(t) ! 0; as Q(t) ! 1: However,
V v(t) ! 0 means that a new variety innovator eventually makes zero pro…t, which cannot
be true. Hence, expectations are contradicted.
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 3






using (14) and (15). Equation (R2) is derived from (R), (F), (18) and (S0), and equation
(S2) is obtained by substituting (S0) into (18).
Result (2): In steady state, equations (R2) and (S2) give
_ »
q










_ Q = 0 ) »
q =
(Q ¡ 1)H=av
[(1 ¡ ")(° ¡ 1) + °a(Q ¡ 1)]Q
: (41)
29Solving them simultaneously for Q yields bQ2 + cQ + d = 0 where b = ½°a=Á > 0;
c = [(1 ¡ ")(° ¡ 1) ¡ °a]½=Á ¡ H[1=' ¡ (° ¡ 1)]=avÁ R 0; d = H=avÁ' > 0 where












Hence, the necessary and su¢cient conditions for two equilibria to exist are
c < 0; c
2 > 4bd: (43)










































tr(J) = ½ + °a»
qQ > 0: (47)
where we use (43) in determining the signs of (45) and (46): The high growth steady state
is associated with jJHj, and the low growth one with jJLj. Since jJHj < 0; the high growth
equilibrium is saddle-path stable, while the low growth equilibrium is unstable because
jJLj > 0 and tr(J) > 0:
Result (3): It is evident from Proposition 2.
Result (4): First consider paths leading to the horizontal axis where »
q = 0 in
Figure 2. Along this axis, H = Hv = »
v=av: The …nancial arbitrage condition (F) for
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which implies that wH ! 1; as »
q ! 0: Along these paths, we must have V v(t)N(t)=av =
wH(t); which implies V v(t) ! 1. However, after the horizontal axis is reached, (38) ap-
plies, so that perfect foresight is contradicted. Next consider trajectories leading upward,






(not drawn in Figure 2). This is derived by substituting »
v = 0 into (S0): Once this curve





av < wH (t); T < t (50)
where T denotes the time when the curve of (49) is hit. N(T) remains after T: However,
(48) and (49) imply that wH(t) ! 0; as Q(t) ! 1: Thus, for (50) to hold, V v(t) ! 0;
as wH(t) ! 0: However, V v(t) ! 0 means that a new variety innovator eventually makes
zero pro…t, which cannot be true. Hence, expectations are contradicted.
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